Abstract. This paper presents a new projective coordinate system and new explicit algorithms which together boost the speed of arithmetic in the divisor class group of genus 2 curves. The proposed formulas generalize the use of Jacobian coordinates on elliptic curves, and their application improves the speed of performing cryptographic scalar multiplications in Jacobians of genus 2 curves over prime fields by an approximate factor of 1.25x. For example, on a single core of an Intel Core i7-3770 (Ivy Bridge), we show that replacing the previous best formulas with our new set improves the cost of generic scalar multiplications from 239,000 to 192,000 cycles and drops the cost of specialized GLV-style scalar multiplications from 155,000 to 123,000 cycles.
Introduction
Motivated by the popularity of low-genus curves in cryptography [26, 27, 33] , we put forward a new system of projective coordinates that facilitates efficient group law computations in the Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2. This paper combines several techniques to arrive at explicit formulas that are significantly faster than those in previous works [12, 29] . The two main ingredients we use in the derivation are:
-The generalization of Jacobian coordinates from the elliptic curve setting to the hyperelliptic curve setting: these coordinates essentially cast affine points into projective space according to the weights of x and y in the defining curve equation.
While applying Jacobian coordinates to elliptic curves is straightforward, their application to hyperelliptic curves requires transferring the x-y weightings into weightings for the Mumford coordinates. As it does for the x-y coordinates in genus 1, this projection naturally balances the Mumford coordinates to facilitate substantial simplifications in the projective genus 2 group law formulas. -The adaptation of Meloni's "co-Z" idea [32] to the genus 2 setting. Although originally proposed in the context of addition-only (e.g. Fibonacci-style) chains, this approach can also be used to gain performance in the more meaningful context of binary addition chains. Moreover, this idea is especially advantageous when used in conjunction with Jacobian coordinates.
The application of the above techniques, as well as some further optimizations discussed in the body of this paper, gives rise to the operation counts in Table 1 -the counts here include field multiplications (M), squarings (S), and multiplications by curve constants (D). Here we make a brief comparison with the previous works in [12, 29] , by considering the two most common operations in the context of cryptographic scalar multiplications: a point doubling (denoted DBL), and a mixed-doubling-and-addition (denoted mDBLADD) between two points. 1 These two operations constitute the bottleneck of most state-of-the-art scalar multiplication routines, since the multiplication of a point in the Jacobian by an n-bit scalar typically requires α DBL operations and β mDBLADD operations, where α + β ≈ n. Thus, the improved operation counts in Table 1 give a rough idea of the speedups that we can expect when plugging these formulas into an existing genus 2 scalar multiplication routine that uses the formulas from [29] or [12] (we give a better indication of the improvements over previous formulas by reporting concrete implementation numbers in Sect. 9). As well as the reduction in field multiplications indicated in Table 1 , the explicit formulas in this paper also require far fewer field additions than those in [12, 29] . We note that the biggest relative difference occurs in the mDBLADD column: among other things, this difference results from the combination of the new coordinate system with the extension of Meloni's idea [32] , which allows us to compute mDBLADD operations independently of the curve constants. On the other hand, when such curve constants are zero, certain operations in this paper become even faster (relatively speaking): for example, on the two special families exhibiting endomorphisms used in [8] , the doubling formulas in [12, 29] save 2D, while the new operation count reported for DBL in Table 1 saves 3S + 2D to drop down to 21M + 9S.
While the formulas in this paper target Jacobians of imaginary genus 2 curves, Gaudry showed in [20] that one can perform cryptographic scalar multiplications much more efficiently in the special case that the Jacobian of the curve C/K has K -rational two-torsion, by instead working on an associated Kummer surface. To illustrate the difference between working on the Kummer surface and working in the full Jacobian group, Gaudry's analogous operation counts are a blazingly fast 6M + 8S for DBL and 16M + 9S for mDBLADD. Referring back to Table 1 , it is clear that raw scalar multiplications on the Kummer surface will remain unrivalled by those in the full Jacobian group. However, there are several cryptographic caveats related to the Kummer surface that justify the con- Table 1 . Field operation counts obtained in this work, versus two previous works, for the most common operations incurred during cryptographic scalar multiplications in Jacobians of genus 2 curves of the form C/K : y 2 = f (x), where f (x) is of degree 5 and the characteristic of K is greater than 5.
Authors

DBL mADD mDBLADD
Lange [29] 3 2 M + 7S + 2D 36M + 5S 68M + 12S + 2D Costello and Lauter [12] 3 0 M + 9S + 2D 36M + 5S 66M + 14S + 2D This work 21M + 12S + 2D 29M + 7S 52M + 11S tinued exploration of fast algorithms for traditional arithmetic in the Jacobian. Namely, Kummer surfaces do not support generic additions, so while they are extremely fast in the realm of key exchange (where such additions are not necessary), it is not yet known how to efficiently use the Kummer surface in a wider realm of cryptographic settings, e.g., for general digital signatures. 2 Furthermore, the absence of generic additions complicates the application of endomorphisms [8, § 8.5] , and from a more pragmatic standpoint, also prevents the use of standard precomputation techniques that exploit fixed system parameters (those of which give huge speedups in practice, even over the Kummer surface [8, § 7.4] ). Thus, all genus 2 implementations that either target signature schemes, use endomorphisms, or optimize the use of precomputation, are currently required to work in the full Jacobian group; 3 and in all of these cases, the formulas in this paper will now offer the most efficient route. The upshot is that in popular practical scenarios the most efficient genus 2 cryptography is likely to result from a hybrid combination of operations on the Kummer surface and in the full Jacobian group. We illustrate this in Sect. 9 by benchmarking genus 2 curves in the context of ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) with perfect forward secrecy: to exploit the best of both worlds, Alice's multiplications of the public generator P by each one of her ephemeral scalars a can make use of our new explicit formulas (and offline precomputations on P) in the full Jacobian, and her resulting ephemeral public keys [a]P can then be mapped onto the corresponding Kummer surface, whose speed can be exploited by Bob in the computation of the shared
A set of Magma [9] scripts verifying all of the explicit formulas and operation counts is publicly available at http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/downloads/37730278-3e37-47eb-91d1-cf889373677a/; and a complete mixed-assembly-and-C implementation of all explicit formulas and scalar multiplication routines is publicly available at http:// hhisil.yasar.edu.tr/files/hisil20140527jacobian.tar.gz.
Preliminaries
For ease of exposition, we immediately restrict to the most cryptographically common case of genus 2 curves, where C is an imaginary hyperelliptic curve over a field K of 2 At least one exception here, as Gaudry points out, is the hashed version of ElGamal signatures [20, § 5.3] . 3 Lubicz and Robert [31] have recently broken through the "full addition restriction" on Kummer varieties, but it is not yet clear how competitive their compatible addition formulas are in the context of raw scalar multiplications.
characteristic greater than 5 (in terms of a general coverage of all genus 2 curves, we mention the interesting remaining scenarios in Sect. 10). Every such curve can then be written as
where we note the absence of an x 4 term in f (x); it can always be removed via a trivial substitution thanks to char(K ) = 5. Let J C denote the Jacobian of C. We assume that we are working with a general point P ∈ J C (K ), whose Mumford representation 4
encodes two affine points (
where we assume that x 1 = x 2 so that these two points are not the same, nor are they the hyperelliptic involution of one another. The Mumford coordinates (q, r, s, t) of P are uniquely determined according to u(
From (1), (2) and (3), it is readily seen that
from which it follows that such general points P lie in the intersection of two hypersurfaces over K [35] , given as
These hypersurfaces can be used to simplify expressions that arise in our derivation and are especially useful in our derivation of unified formulas in Sect. 7. We note that a more simple relation is found by taking r S 1 − qS 0 .
Our driving motivation for improving the explicit formulas for arithmetic in the Jacobian is the application of enhancing the fundamental operation in curve-based cryptosystems: the scalar multiplication [k]P of an integer k ∈ Z by a general point P in J C . Such scalar multiplications are computed using a sequence of point doubling and addition operations, and so a common way of comparing different sets of addition formulas is to tally the number of field multiplications (M), field squarings (S), and field additions (a) that each point operation incurs. In cryptographic contexts, the input and output points are typically required to be in their unique affine form, while intermediate computations are carried out in projective space to avoid inversions. Thus, the most commonly reported operation counts include: DBL, which refers to the addition of a Jacobian point in projective form to itself; ADD, which refers to the addition between two distinct points in projective form; mADD, which refers to the mixed addition between a projective point and an affine point; and mDBLADD, which refers to the combined doubling of a projective point and subsequent addition of the result with an affine point.
As is done in [29, § 5-6] , in this paper we focus on deriving formulas for the most common cases of arithmetic in J C . This set of formulas is enough to perform and benchmark scalar multiplications in J C , since the possible input/output cases are extremely dense among all possible scenarios, i.e. for random input points P and scalars k, the cases not covered by these formulas have an exponentially small probability of being encountered in the scalar multiplication routine (see [29, § 1.2] for a similar discussion). Nevertheless, the set of formulas we present are still far from a complete and cryptographically adequate coverage, so it is important to distinguish exactly which input/output cases they do apply to. We clarify this in Assumption 1 below and return to this discussion in Sect. 8.3.
Assumption 1 (General points and operations in J C )
Throughout this paper, we assume that all input and output points are "general" points in J C : we say that P ∈ J C is general if the Mumford representation of P encodes two distinct affine points (x 1 , y 1 ) and (x 2 , y 2 ) on C, where x 1 = x 2 . Moreover, all operations in this paper are of the form P 1 + P 2 = P 3 , where we assume that P 1 , P 2 and P 3 are general points and that we are in one of two cases: (i) either P 1 = P 2 , in which case we are computing the "doubling" P 3 = [2]P 1 , where we further assume that neither of the two x-coordinates encoded by P 1 coincide with the two encoded by P 3 , or (ii) that of the six points encoded by P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , no two share the same x-coordinate.
Extending Jacobian Coordinates to Jacobians
Let λ be a nonzero element in K . Over fields of large characteristic, Jacobian coordinates have proven to be a natural and efficient way to work projectively on elliptic curves in short Weierstrass form E/K : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b. Indeed, in cryptographic contexts, using the triple (λ 2 X : [33, p. 424] , and his comment that this representation "appears best" still holds true after decades of further exploration: Jacobian coordinates (and extended variants) remain the most efficient way to work on such general Weierstrass curves [5] . Moreover, the weightings wt(x) = 2 and wt(y) = 3 are the orders of the poles of the functions x and y at the point at infinity on E.
In the context of imaginary hyperelliptic curves of the form
the analogous weightings are wt(x) = 2, and wt(y) = 5,
under which the affine point
Indeed, the weights wt(x) = 2 and wt(y) = 5 are the orders of the poles of x and y at the (unique) point at infinity on C. Since we perform arithmetic using the Mumford coordinates in J C , rather than the x-y coordinates on C, we transfer the above weightings across to the Mumford coordinates via Eq. (3), which yields
Combining (6) and (8) then gives
which suggests the use of (λ 2 Q : λ 4 R : λ 3 S : λ 5 T : λZ ) ∈ P(2, 4, 3, 5, 1)(K ) to represent the affine point
Equation (10) is at the heart of this paper. We found these weightings to be highly advantageous for group law computations: the Mumford coordinates balance naturally under this projection, and significant simplifications occur regularly in the derivation of the corresponding explicit formulas. This coordinate system is referred to as Jacobian coordinates in this paper. We note that, in line with Assumption 1, we will not work with the full projective closure of the affine part in P(2, 4, 3, 5, 1)(K ), but rather with the affine patch where Z = 0.
Just as in [29, § 6] , we found it useful to introduce an additional coordinate (independent of Z ) in the denominator of the two coordinates corresponding to the v-polynomial in the Mumford representation. So, in addition to the Jacobian coordinate Z , we include the coordinate W and use the projective six-tuple (λ 2 Q : λ 4 R : λ 3 μS : λ 5 μT : λZ : μW ) to represent the affine point
for some nonzero μ in K . This coordinate system is referred to as auxiliary Jacobian coordinates in this paper.
Remark 1
We note the distinction between the above coordinate weightings and the weightings used by Lange, which were also said to "generalise the concept of Jacobian coordinates . . .from elliptic to hyperelliptic curves" [29, § 6] . In terms of the first pro-
Although these weight the u-and v-polynomials of a point with the same (Jacobian) weightings as the x-and y-coordinates on an elliptic curve, the derivation of the weightings in (10) draws a closer analogy with the use of Jacobian coordinates in genus 1. This is why we dubbed the weightings used in this work as "Jacobian coordinates".
Adopting the "co-Z" Approach
With the aim of improving addition formulas on elliptic curves, Meloni [32] put forward a nice idea that is particularly suited to working in Jacobian coordinates. In the explicit addition of two elliptic curve points (X 1 :
which respectively correspond to the points ( 2 , so now it is only Z 3 that depends on Z 1 . Since two projective points are unlikely to share the same Z -coordinate in general, the method starts by updating one or both of the input points to force this equivalence. The obvious way to do this is to respectively cross-multiply (X 1 :
, but as it stands, performing this update would incur a significant overhead. The observation that is key to making this "co-Z" approach advantageous is that, in the context of scalar multiplications, these updated values (or the main subexpressions within them) are often already computed in the previous operation [32, p. 192] , so this update can be performed either for free, or with a much smaller overhead.
Meloni did not apply his idea to classical "double-and-add" style addition chains, but subsequent papers [23, 30] showed how his approach could be used to enhance performance in such binary chains (these chains are preferred in cryptographic contexts due to the ease of using them to achieve various side-channel resistant properties inside a scalar multiplication routine). In genus 2 however, successful transferral of the "co-Z" idea has not yet been achieved: the work in [28] also uses non-binary addition chains, and crucially, it was performed without access to the hyperelliptic analogue of Jacobian coordinates (those which work in stronger synergy with Meloni's idea).
Equipped with the Jacobian coordinates described in the previous section, our adaptation of the "co-Z" approach requires that both the Z and W coordinates are the same, for two different input points. The first projective formulas we derive in Sect. 6 are for the "co-ZW" addition between the two points P 1 = (Q 1 :
, and this routine is then used as a subroutine for all subsequent operations (except for standalone doublings).
Arithmetic in Affine Coordinates with New Common Subexpressions
The explicit formulas for arithmetic in genus 2 Jacobians are significantly more complicated than their elliptic curve counterparts, so it is especially useful to start the derivation by looking for common subexpressions and advantageous orderings in the affine versions of the formulas (i.e., before the introduction of more coordinates complicates the situation further). Our derivation follows that of [12] , but it is important to point out that the resulting affine formulas have been refined by grouping new subexpressions throughout; these groupings were strategically chosen to exploit the symmetries of the q and r coordinates, and especially for the application of Jacobian coordinates that follows in Sect. 6 .
In what follows, we give the affine formulas for general point additions and general point doublings, respectively. From Sect. 2, recall the abbreviated notation (q, r, s, t) ∈ A 4 (K ) for the point in J C with Mumford representation (x 2 + qx + r, sx + t).
Let
be points in J C satisfying Assumption 1. The choice of the three subexpressions
is key to our refined derivation. The point P 3 is then given by
These formulas are used to derive the projective co-ZW addition formulas in Sect. 6.1, those which form a basis for all of the other (non-doubling) formulas in this work.
be points in J C satisfying Assumption 1. Again, it is particularly useful to make use of three subexpressions:
The point P 3 is then given by
These formulas are used to derive projective doubling formulas in Sect. 6.4.
Projective Arithmetic in Extended Jacobian Coordinates
In this section we derive all of the explicit formulas that are needed for the scalar multiplication routines we describe in Sect. 8. The formulas are summarized in Table 2 below, where we immediately note the extension of auxiliary Jacobian coordinates discussed in Sect. 3 to include W 2 ; it is advantageous to carry this additional coordinate between consecutive operations because it is often computed en route to the output points already and therefore comes for free as input into the following operation. We refer to this extended version of auxiliary Jacobian coordinates as extended Jacobian coordinates, 5 and point out that all of the algorithms derived in this section produce outputs in this extended coordinate system, i.e., with W 2 included. Table 2 reports the "plain" operation counts, those which correspond to our deriving sets of formulas with the aim of minimising the total number of all field operations. In "Trade-Offs and Further Optimizations" in Appendix, we provide an additional set of operation counts that correspond to the exploitation of various trade-offs in the formulas. If W 2 is dropped from the coordinate system, and we work only with auxiliary Jacobian coordinates, (Q : R : S : T : Z : W), then we note that the DBL (and DBLa2a3zero-see "Trade-Offs and Further Optimizations" in Appendix) algorithms would require one extra squaring. The only other change resulting from this abbreviated coordinate system would be in the "trade-off" version of ADD (again, see "Trade-Offs and Further Optimizations" in Appendix), where a squaring would revert back to a multiplication. All other operation counts would remain unchanged.
Following on from the discussion in Sect. 4, in Sect. 6.1 we start the derivations by using the affine addition formulas in (12) to develop projective formulas for zwADD; these are then used in the derivation of the formulas for ADD in Sect. 6.2, for mADD in Sect. 6.3, and for mDBLADD in Sect. 6.5. Finally, we use the affine doubling formulas in (13) to develop projective formulas for DBL in Sect. 6.4. In what follows, the square brackets around the expressions
, and [B 2 ] are used to emphasize how the common subexpressions B and C 5 In this case we will always write the last coordinate as W 2 to illustrate the relationship between the last two coordinates. We subsequently note the difference between the computation of W 2 and its use as a variable in the algorithm; for example, see steps 36 and 38 of Algorithm 1. 
become useful for updating the first operand with respect to the corresponding coordinate weights. Therefore, these brackets can be omitted.
Projective co-ZW Addition: zwADD
, and
represent three points in J C satisfying Assumption 1. We emphasize that P 1 and P 2 need not contain W 2 1 , which is why both are given in auxiliary Jacobian coordinates. However, the output P 3 is in extended Jacobian coordinates. The projective form of (12) in extended Jacobian coordinates corresponds to the following. We define the subexpressions
This operation, referred to as zwADD, not only computes P 3 , but also produces the subexpressions
, W 2 1 B 2 ; if desired, these can be used to update P 1 to be of the form
so that it now has the same Z , W , and W 2 coordinates as P 3 . The combination of the zwADD operation and this update will be denoted using the syntax (P 3 , P 1 ) ← P 1 + P 2 , where P 1 is the updated (but projectively equivalent) version of P 1 . The "plain" version of the explicit formulas for the zwADD operation cost 25M + 3S + 22a and are provided in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Projective co-ZW addition: zwADD.
Input: Two distinct points
Output: The point P 3 :
. n 06 ← n 05 − n 02 7. n 07 ← n 01 · R 2 8. n 08 ← n 02 · n 03 9. n 09 ← n 01 · n 04 10. n 10 ← n 09 − n 08 11. n 11 ← n 06 · n 04 12. n 12 ← n 07 · n 03 13. n 13 ← n 12 − n 11 14. n 14 ← n 07 · n 01 15. n 15 ← n 06 · n 02 16. n 16 ← n 15 − n 14 17. n 01 ← n 2 10 18. n 02 ← n 10 · n 01
Algorithm 2 Projective addition: ADD.
Output: The point
Projective Addition: ADD
Rather than producing lengthy formulas for additions, we use a simple construction that exploits zwADD.
2 , and
represent three points in J C satisfying Assumption 1. We can then cross-multiply to define the points in auxiliary Jacobian coordinates
Observe that P 1 = P 1 and P 2 = P 2 , but that P 1 and P 2 now share the same Z and W coordinates. This means that we can use the zwADD operation defined in Sect. 6.1 to compute P 3 = P 1 + P 2 as (P 3 , P 1 ):=P 1 + P 2 . Observe that P 1 = P 1 , and that P 1 will share the same Z , W , and W 2 coordinates as P 3 . We note that this update of P 1 into P 1 can be useful in the generation of lookup tables [30] , but is generally not useful during the main loop of a scalar multiplication. The "plain" version of the explicit formulas for the ADD operation costs 41M + 7S + 22a and is provided in Algorithm 2.
Projective Mixed Addition: mADD
T 2 : 1 : 1 : 1), and
represent three points in J C satisfying Assumption 1. This time we only need to update P 2 into P 2 , which is performed in auxiliary Jacobian coordinates as
where we observe that P 1 and P 2 now have the same Z and W coordinates. Subsequently, using the zwADD operation from Sect. 6.1 allows P 3 = P 1 + P 2 to be computed by (P 3 , P 1 ):=P 1 + P 2 . The "plain" version of the explicit formulas for the mADD operation cost 32M + 5S + 22a and are provided in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3
Projective mixed addition: mADD.
and P 2 = (Q 2 : R 2 : S 2 : T 2 : 1 : 1 : 1) in J C satisfying Assumption 1.
Output: The point P
3 ← P 1 + P 2 = Q 3 : R 3 : S 3 : T 3 : Z 3 : W 3 : W 2 3 in J C . 1. n 01 ← Z 2 1 2. n 02 ← n 2 01 3. n 03 ← W 1 · Z 1 4.Q 2 ← Q 2 · n 01 5.R 2 ← R 2 · n 02 6. n 04 ← n 03 · n 01 7.S 2 ← S 2 · n 04 8. n 05 ← n 03 · n 02 9.T 2 ← T 2 · n 05 10. return zwADD(Q 1 ,R 1 ,S 1 ,T 1 ,Z 1 ,W 1 ,Q 2 ,R 2 ,S 2 ,T 2 ) via Algorithm 1.
Projective Doubling: DBL
and
represent two points in J C satisfying Assumption 1. The projective form of (13) in extended Jacobian coordinates corresponds to the following. We define the subexpressions
We can then write P 3 as
The DBL operation not only computes P 3 , but also produces the subexpressions
, W 2 1 B 2 ; if desired, these can be used to update P 1 into
in order to share the same Z , W , and W 2 coordinates with P 3 . The "plain" version of the explicit formulas for the DBL operation cost 26M + 8S + 2D + 25a and are provided in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Projective doubling: DBL.
Input: The point 
Projective Mixed-Doubling-and-Addition: mDBLADD
represent three points in J C satisfying Assumption 1. To compute [2]P 1 + P 2 , we schedule the higher level operations in the form (P 1 + P 2 ) + P 1 (see [15, 30] for the same high level scheduling). This means that mDBLADD can be computed using an mADD operation before a zwADD operation (subsequently, we must also assume that P 1 , the intermediate point P 1 + P 2 , and the output point [2]P 1 + P 2 =: P 3 = Q 3 : R 3 : S 3 : T 3 : Z 3 : W 3 : W 2 3 represent three points in J C satisfying Assumption 1). Following Sects. 6.2 and 6.3, the mDBLADD operation can be computed in 57M + 8S + 42a via the explicit formulas provided in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5
Projective mixed doubling-and-addition: mDBLADD.
Input: Two distinct points
Output: The point P
3 :=[2]P 1 + P 2 = Q 3 : R 3 : S 3 : T 3 : Z 3 : W 3 : W 2 3 in J C . 1. Q 3 , R 3 , S 3 , T 3 , Z 3 , W 3 , (W 2 3 ),Q 1 ,R 1 ,S 1 ,T 1 := mADD(Q 1 , R 1 , S 1 , T 1 , Z 1 , W 1 , (W 2 1 ), Q 2 , R 2 , S 2 , T 2 ) via Algorithm 3. 2. return zwADD(Q 3 , R 3 , S 3 , T 3 , Z 3 , W 3 ,Q 1 ,R 1 ,S 1 ,T 1 ) via Algorithm 1.
Unified Arithmetic
In this section we derive explicit formulas for unified additions: these are addition formulas that work both when the inputs are distinct and when the inputs are equivalent. Although we still need to assume the genericity conditions in Assumption 1, the applicability of our unified formulas no longer requires us to distinguish between the two cases stated there. For example, while the ADD formulas derived in Sect. 6.2 assume that our input points belong to case (ii) but not to case (i), and the DBL formulas derived in Sect. 6.2 assume that the input points are in case (i) but not case (ii), the uADD formulas derived in this section will compute correctly regardless of whether the input points are in case (i) or case (ii).
Explicit unified addition formulas have already been developed by Diao and Joye in affine coordinates [13] . The proposed formulas below differ from Diao and Joye's formulas but produce the same results.
With notation as in Sect. 6, and provided that Assumption 1 is modified according to the discussion above, the addition of two (not necessarily distinct) points can be performed by first defining the common subexpressions
and then computing
Algorithm 6 Projective co-ZW unified addition: zwuADD. We note the necessity of the hypersurfaces in (5) in the derivation of unified formulas. Just as the curve equation is used to eliminate the (otherwise zero) denominator in λ = (y 2 − y 1 )/(x 2 − x 1 ) in the case of Weierstrass elliptic curves [10] , the relations in (5) are used to the same effect in our case: notice, for example, that the denominators B and C in the regular addition formulas in (12) are always zero if the input points P 1 and P 2 are the same, but that this is generally not the case for the formulas in (16) . We note that substituting q 2 = q 1 , r 2 = r 1 , s 2 = s 1 , and t 2 = t 1 will recover the proposed doubling formulas in Sect. 5.
Next, we port these formulas to extended Jacobian coordinates. We define the following subexpressions
. Now, we can write P 1 + P 2 =:
where
Just like zwADD and DBL, the operation zwuADD produces the subexpressions Q 1 C 2 ,
, along with P 3 -see Sects. 6.1 and 6.4. Explicit formulas for the zwuADD operation are in Algorithm 6. We note that the zwuADD operation requires the extra input W 2 1 . Output: The point
The corresponding unified addition formulas, uADD, and mixed unified addition formulas, muADD, are easy to derive: the function calls for zwADD in ADD and mADD are replaced with zwuADD. Explicit formulas for the uADD and muADD operations are in Algorithm 7 and Algorithm 8 respectively.
The resulting operation counts for the unified addition operations in extended Jacobian coordinates are summarized in Table 3 .
Implementation
We chose two different curves to showcase the explicit formulas derived in the previous section, both of which target the 128-bit security level. Table 3 . Operation counts for unified arithmetic in the Jacobian of imaginary hyperelliptic curves.
Unified operation in J C
Field operations ("plain")
The first curve was found in the colossal point counting effort undertaken by Gaudry and Schost [22] . From a security standpoint, it is both twist-secure and it is not considered to be special (e.g. it has a large discriminant); from a performance standpoint, it was chosen over the arithmetically advantageous field F p with p = 2 127 −1, and with optimal cofactors such that the curve supports a Gaudry-style Kummer surface implementation [20] . This is the same Kummer surface that was used to set speed records in [3, 8] . We chose the Jacobian of this curve to illustrate the performance that is gained when using our new formulas inside a general "double-and-add" scalar multiplication routine.
The second curve supports a 4-dimensional Gallant-Lambert-Vanstone (GLV) decomposition [19] . Over prime fields, requiring 4-dimensional GLV imposes that the Jacobian has complex multiplication (CM) by a special field-in this case it is Q(ζ 5 ). This (specialness) means that we cannot hope to find a twist-secure curve over a particular prime, but rather that we must search over many primes. In the same vein as [8, § 8 .3], we also wanted this curve to support a rational Gaudry-style Kummer surface. This curve is defined over the prime field p = 2 128 − c with c = 7689975, which is the smallest c > 0 such that a curve with CM by Q(ζ 5 ) over F p is twist-secure with optimal cofactors. 6 This curve was chosen to exhibit the performance that is gained when using our new formulas inside a GLV-style multiexponentiation; in particular, each step of the multiexponentiation requires only an mDBLADD operation, and this is where our explicit formulas offer the largest relative speedup over the previous ones.
Working on the Gaudry-Schost Jacobian
Let p = 2 127 − 1, and define the following constants in 
is such that # J C Ros = 2 4 · r and # J C Ros = 2 4 · r , where r and r are 250-and 251-bit primes respectively [22] , and where C Ros is the quadratic twist of C Ros . The coefficient of x 4 in C Ros is α = −(1 + λ + μ + ν), and we choose to zero it under the transformation ϕ : C Ros →C, (x, y) → (x − α/5, y). The resulting curve,C, has a coefficient of x 3 which is a fourth power in F p ; let it be u −4 , where we chose u = 19, 859, 741, 192, 276, 546, 142, 105, 456, 991, 319, 328, 298. We can then use the map ψ :
where the coefficient of x 3 being 1 saves a multiplication inside every point doubling. 7 We use the name Jac1271 for the Jacobian J C and use the name Kum1271 for the associated Kummer surface K -this is defined by the above constants a, b, c, d (see [20] ). 6 It is relatively straightforward to show that if J C has CM by Q(ζ 5 ) and full rational two-torsion, then either J C or J C must contain a point of order 5; thus, the optimal cofactors are 16 and 80. 7 If the coefficient of x 3 inC was not a fourth power, one could still use this form of transformation to achieve another "small" coefficient, or in this case, work on the twist instead.
In Sect. 9 we report two new sets of implementation numbers on Jac1271. First, we benchmark a generic scalar multiplication, using both the old and the new formulas, to illustrate the performance boost given by this work in the general case. In addition, we benchmark a fixed-base scalar multiplication, which uses the new formulas and takes advantage of precomputations on a public generator to give large speedups on Jac1271. In the context of ECDHE, this second benchmark corresponds to the "key_gen" phase, which compliments the performance numbers for the "shared_secret" scalar multiplications on Kum1271 in [3, 8] (we discuss some caveats related to this Jacobian/Kummer combination in Sect. 8.3). To tie these two sets of performance numbers together, we also benchmark the numbers for computing the map from Jac1271 onto Kum1271, which was made explicit in the AVIsogenies library [7] , and for general points in J C Ros is given as
For practical scenarios like ECDHE, it is fortunate that we only need the map in this direction, as the pullback map from K to J C Ros is much more complicated [20, § 4.3] . Since we compute in J C (rather than J C Ros ), we actually need to compute the composition of Ψ with (ψϕ) −1 , which when extended to general points in J C is
Assuming that the input point in J C is in extended Jacobian coordinates, the operation count for the full map Ψ = Ψ (ψϕ) −1 from J C to K is 1I + 31M + 2S + 19a-see Algorithm 9. We benchmark this map alongside the scalar multiplications in Sect. 9.
To draw a fair comparison against prior works, we inserted our formulas into the software made publicly available by Bos et al. [8] , which itself employed the previous best formulas. We tweaked both sets of formulas for Jac1271 to take advantage of the constant a 3 = 1 (see "Trade-Offs and Further Optimizations" in Appendix for details). This software computes the scalar multiplications on Jac1271 using an adaptation of the left-to-right signed sliding window recoding from [1] with a window size of w = 5, where the lookup table consists of 8 points and is constructed using the same approach as in [30, § 4] . The timings are presented in Sect. 9.
Working on the Jacobian of a GLV Curve
Let p = 2 128 − 7,689,975 and define C/F p : y 2 = x 5 + 7 10 . The Jacobian groups J C and J C have cardinalities # J C = 2 4 · 5 · r and # J C = 2 4 · r , where are both prime. The implementation of a 4-dimensional GLV scalar multiplication in J C follows that which is described in [8, § 6] ; again, we wrapped their GLV software around both their old and our new formulas for a fair comparison. In addition, both sets of explicit formulas were modified to take advantage of the curve constants having a 2 = a 3 = 0 (see "TradeOffs and Further Optimizations" in Appendix for the modification in our case). We note that both instances were made to use the above curve, which we refer to as GLV128c.
Practically speaking, it does not make as much sense to benchmark GLV128c in the same ECDHE style as we discussed for Jac1271 and Kum1271. If there is enough storage to exploit a long-term public generator P, then the presence of endomorphisms is essentially redundant in the key_gen phase, since multiples of P can then be precomputed offline without using an endomorphism. On the shared_secret side, where variable-base scalar multiplications are performed on fresh inputs, our implementations show that a 4-dimensional decomposition on GLV128c is still slightly slower than a Kummer surface scalar multiplication, so in the case of ECDHE, it is likely to be faster on both sides to stick with the combination of Jac1271 and Kum1271. Nevertheless, there could be scenarios where it makes sense to use the endomorphism on GLV128c (e.g. for a signature verification) and still make use of the maps between the full Jacobian group and the associated Kummer surface. In this case, the map in (18) and the pullback map in [20, § 4.3] can be exploited analogously to the case of Jac1271, keeping in mind that the maps would pass through the Jacobian of the Rosenhain form of C.
Timings for a 4-dimensional GLV variable-base scalar multiplication on GLV128c using both the old and the new explicit formulas are given in Sect. 9 .
We note that in all scalar multiplication routines, i.e. in both fixed-and variablebase scalar multiplications on Jac1271 and in 4-dimensional multiexponentiations on GLV128c, we always found it advantageous to convert the lookup table elements from extended Jacobian coordinates to affine coordinates using Montgomery's simultaneous inversion method [34] . This "decision" is generally made easier in genus 2, where the difference between mixed additions and full additions is greater, and the relative cost of a field inversion (compared to the rest of the scalar multiplication routine) is much less than it is in the elliptic curve case. Finally, we note that the single conversion of the output point from Jacobian to affine coordinates comes at a cost of 1I + 10M + 1S-see Algorithm 10.
Algorithm 10
Mapping from auxiliary Jacobian coordinates to affine coordinates.
Input:
The point P 1 in J C , given in auxiliary Jacobian coordinates as
Output: The same point in affine coordinates as P 1 = (q 1 , r 1 , s 1 , t 1 ). r 1 , s 1 , t 1 ).
A disclaimer: The Difficulties Facing Constant-Time, Exception-Free Scalar Multiplications in J C
We must point out that none of the scalar multiplications on Jac1271 or GLV128c that we report in this paper run in constant time and that the difficulties of achieving such a routine in genus 2 Jacobians are closely related to Assumption 1. We note that these are not the same implementation-level difficulties pointed out in [3, § 1.2] ; indeed, while the Kummer surface implementations reported in [3, 8] run in constant time, a truly constant-time genus 2 implementation that does not use the Kummer surface is yet to be documented in the literature.
More specifically, there are scalar recoding algorithms (cf. [16, 24] ) that make it possible to implement the Jac1271 or GLV128c routines such that scalar multiplications on random inputs will run in constant time with probability exponentially close to 1. However, in order to guard against active adversaries and to be considered truly constanttime, the routines should be guaranteed to execute identically and run correctly for all combinations of integer scalars and input points; this means the explicit formulas must be able to handle input combinations in J C that are not "general" in the sense of Assumption 1. Although explicit formulas can be developed for each of these special cases, their culmination into an efficient and truly constant-time scalar multiplication algorithm remains an important open problem.
Results
In this section we present the timings of the routines described in the previous section. The primary purpose of our benchmarks is to compare the performance of scalar multiplications in genus 2 Jacobians using both the old and new sets of explicit formulas, on a range of popular platforms. 8 Table 4 reports that a generic variable-base scalar multiplication on Jac1271 using the explicit formulas in this paper gives a factor 1.21-1.31x improvement over one that uses the previous best formulas; this is the approximate speedup that one can expect when adopting extended Jacobian coordinates on any imaginary hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 over a large prime field. On the same curve, the performance numbers in Table 4 show that fixed-base scalar multiplications (using a precomputed lookup table of 256 KB) are improved by a factor 1.07-1.16x using the new explicit formulas. Table 4 also reports that a 4-dimensional GLV multiexponentiation routine using the explicit formulas in this paper gives a factor 1.19-1.26x improvement over the same routine that calls the previous explicit formulas; on this curve, fixed-base scalar multiplications are improved by a factor 1.14-1.20x. We note that the benchmarked implementations of the new formulas always used the "plain" versions (see Table 2 ), since these proved to be more efficient than the "trade-off" versions in our implementations.
In Table 5 we give summary performance numbers for the Gaudry-Schost curve in Sect. 8.1 in the context of ECDHE. Using extended Jacobian coordinates and precomputing a lookup table of size 256 KB, each key_gen operation takes around 30,000 Ivy Bridge cycles in total. Together with the recent Kummer surface performance numbers of Bernstein et al. [3] , this gives an idea of the performance that is possible when space permits a significant precomputation in genus 2 ECDHE. However, it must be pointed out that until an efficient remedy to the issues discussed in Sect. 8.3 is known, this style of key_gen in genus 2 is unprotected against side-channel attacks. We note that this fixed-base cycle count excludes the cycles required to transfer the lookup table from the main memory to the cache. We also note that, since the lookup table is the exact size of the L2 cache (on all three of the Intel architectures in Table 4 ), benchmarking fixed-base scalar multiplications with randomized scalars on these processors gave rise to regular L1 cache misses and occasional L2 cache misses, the former adding a non-negligible Numbers are given in thousands of clock cycles on four popular architectures: "AMD" (AMD A8 PRO-7600B CPU @ 3.10 GHz), "San" (Intel "Sandy Bridge" Core i7-2600 CPU @ 3.40 GHz), "Ivy" (Intel "Ivy Bridge" Core i7-3770 CPU @ 3.40 GHz), and "Has" (Intel "Haswell" Core i7-4770 CPU @ 3.40 GHz). All of the numbers were obtained with over-clocking ("turbo-boost" and "turbo-core") disabled, using the SUPERCOP [6] toolkit overhead to the routine. We benchmarked a fixed-base scalar multiplication with a much smaller 1 KB lookup table, but it ran in 87,000 cycles, which when combined with the Ψ map, is not faster than the scalar multiplication on Kum1271 from [3] . We reiterate that, to get the performance numbers in Table 4 and for key_gen in Table 5 , we modified the software made publicly available by Bos et al. [8] to be able to call both sets of explicit formulas. This software already included routines for general scalar multiplications, 4-GLV scalar multiplications, and the fixed-base scenario. To complete the benchmarks in Table 5 , we ran the publicly available software from [3] on our hardware.
Related Scenarios
We conclude by mentioning some related cases of interest, for which the analogue of (extended) Jacobian coordinates and/or the co-Z idea could also be applied. The takeaway message of this section is that, while we focussed on the most common instance of genus 2 curves, the ideas in this work have the potential to boost the speed of arithmetic in other scenarios too.
-Real hyperelliptic curves In Sect. 2 we immediately specialized to the imaginary case, where C/K is hyperelliptic of degree 5 with one point at infinity. The other case in genus 2, where the curve is of degree 6 and has two points at infinity [17] , has received less attention in papers pursuing high performance, since it is slightly slower than the imaginary case [14] . Moreover, it is often the case (at least among the scenarios of practical interest) that a degree 6 model contains a rational Weierstrass point and can therefore be transformed to a degree 5 model (e.g. the family in [21, § 4.4] ). On the other hand, there are some scenarios where this transformation is not always possible, so it is of interest to see how efficient projective arithmetic can be made in the real case, and whether analogues of the ideas in this work can be carried across successfully. -Pairings Genus 2 pairings are also likely to benefit from Jacobian coordinates.
Roughly speaking, the explicit formulas in this paper inherently compute the additional components (i.e. the Miller functions) that are required in a pairing computation. However, the resulting savings would not be as drastic, as the operations in J C are dominated by extension field operations in a pairing computation. In addition, genus 2 has not been as competitive in the realm of pairings as it has as a standard discrete logarithm primitive, largely because the construction of competitive ordinary, pairing-friendly hyperelliptic curves has been very limited. On the other hand, there are attractive constructions of supersingular genus 2 curves [18] , which may be of interest in the "Type 1" setting, especially given that the fastest instantiations of such pairings are (in recent times) considered broken [2] . Interestingly, the construction in [18, § 7] is one example of a scenario where the real model cannot be converted into an imaginary one in general. -Low characteristic/higher genus The specialization of Jacobian coordinates to low characteristic genus 2 curves and the extension to higher genus imaginary hyperelliptic curves follows analogously. However, the motivation in both directions is nowadays stunted by their respective security concerns. Nevertheless, it could be worthwhile to see how much faster the arithmetic in these cases can become when using Jacobian coordinates. -The RM families We benchmarked the new explicit formulas in two scenarios; on a non-special "generic" curve, and on a curve with very special CM that subsequently comes equipped with an endomorphism. A third option comes from the families with explicit RM in [21] , which perhaps achieves the best of both worlds in genus 2: they also come equipped with an endomorphism, but are much more general than the CM curve we used. This generality dispels any security concerns associated with special curves and moreover allows them to be found over a fixed prime field. Thus, at the 128-bit security level, one could find such a curve over p = 2 127 − 1 that facilitates both 2-dimensional GLV decomposition on its Jacobian and which supports a (twist-secure) Kummer surface. It would then be interesting to benchmark the new explicit formulas on one of these families, where the GLV routine would again make a higher relative frequency of calls to the fast mDBLADD routine.
Appendix: Trade-Offs and Further Optimizations
In this section we discuss various trade-offs that can be exploited in the explicit formulas, as well as further optimizations that apply to special cases.
Trade-Offs
Throughout the paper we have presented the "plain" version of the explicit formulas that do not exploit various possibilities for trade-offs. In this section we present the modified operation counts that result if such trade-offs are simultaneously exploited-see Table 6 . Generally speaking, the "trade-off" versions of the formulas involve fewer field multiplications at the expense of a few more field squarings and/or many more field additions. The usefulness of these trade-offs depends on the implementation; they were not exploited in the implementation in Sect. 9 because the cost of additions/subtractions are not negligible in comparison with the cost of a multiplication/squaring for modular reductions when using primes of the form 2 127 − 1 or 2 128 − c. On the other hand, some of these trade-offs might still be useful in other settings. Furthermore, similar trade-offs were exploited in [12] , so we included them in our analysis for a fair comparison.
The claimed "trade-off" operation counts in Table 1 of Sect. 1 and in Table 6 in this section can be precisely justified 9 . by applying the following trade-offs:
-The zwADD, zwuADD, and DBL operations perform a matrix resultant computation for which the operation count is 6M + 3a. These operations can be traded with 5M + 17a using the derivation based on [25, Section 3.6, Type-M 4 ] (see also [12] ). -All of the explicit algorithms in this paper can make use of the standard "M-S trade-off" trick, which exploits the relation XY = ((X + Y ) 2 − X 2 − Y 2 )/2 to trade 1M with 1S + 4a whenever X 2 and Y 2 are computed in advance. Table 6 . Comparison of operation counts with and without various trade-offs for operations in the Jacobian, J C , of an imaginary hyperelliptic curve C/K of genus 2, with char(K ) > 5.
Operation in J C Field operations "plain" w. "trade-offs" zwADD 25M + 3S + 22a 23M + 4S + 40a ADD 41M + 7S + 22a 35M + 12S + 56a mADD 32M + 5S + 22a 29M + 7S + 44a mDBLADD 57M + 8S + 42a 52M + 11S + 82a DBL 26M + 8S + 2D + 25a 21M + 12S + 2D + 52a DBLa2a3zero 25M + 6S + 22a 21M + 9S + 48a zwuADD 31M+7S+2D+32a 27M + 10S + 2D + 58a uADD 48M + 13S + 2D + 32a 40M + 20S + 2D + 74a muADD 38M + 8S + 2D + 32a 33M + 12S + 2D + 62a
The DBLa2a3zero operation is the DBL operation in the special case that the curve constants a 2 and a 3 are zero-see "Further Optimizations" in Appendix -Further M-S trade-off options were exploited through an extension of the new projective coordinates by W 2 . -Additional M-S trade-off options could be exploited through a selective extension of projective coordinates by Q 2 , S 2 , T 2 . These are not reflected ins Table 6 for simplicity.
Further Optimizations
We conclude by mentioning further optimizations that are possible in certain scenarios. Firstly, in the case that the curve constant a 3 = 1 or the case that a 3 = a 2 = 0 (both of which were applicable to our two chosen curves in Sect. 8), the DBL, zwuADD, uADD, and muADD algorithms can all be slightly simplified. Note that both of these simplifications in the DBL algorithm are presented in our online Magma code, and the operation count for the case of doubling when a 2 = a 3 = 0, i.e. DBLa2a3zero, is given in Table 6 (we point out that updating the unified algorithms amounts to updating the steps that involve these constants accordingly). A further extension of the new coordinates by Z 2 , Z 4 , Z 3 W , Z 5 W , with an analogy to Weierstrass form elliptic curves (see [11] ), speeds up the generic additions. One technicality is that only Z 2 and Z 4 are used by the doubling algorithm. Therefore, an extension by Z 2 and Z 4 is more attractive in the context of scalar multiplication. The concept of re-additions can also help in optimizing the scalar multiplication (see [4] ). However, as mentioned in Sect. 8.2, it is even better to normalize the look-up table both by W and Z coordinates and to make calls to either DBL or mDBLADD in each iteration of the main loop. Therefore, the new coordinates are never extended by any of the extra coordinates Z 2 , Z 4 , Z 3 W , or Z 5 W in our implementation.
